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The Case for the Ability Based Model of Emotional Intelligence 
In Organizational Behavior 
Abstract 
In this second counterpoint article, we refute the claims of Landy, Locke, and 
Conte, and make the more specific case for our perspective, which is that ability-based 
models of emotional intelligence have value to add in the domain of organizational 
psychology.  In this article, we address remaining issues, such as general concerns about 
the tenor and tone of the debates on this topic, a tendency for detractors to collapse across 
emotional intelligence models when reviewing the evidence and making judgments, and 
subsequent penchant to thereby discount all models, including the ability-based one, as 
lacking validity.  We specifically refute the following three claims from our critics with 
the most recent empirically-based evidence:  (1) emotional intelligence is dominated by 
opportunistic ‘academics-turned-consultants’ who have amassed much fame and fortune 
based on a concept that is shabby science at best; (2) the measurement of emotional 
intelligence is grounded in unstable, psychometrically flawed instruments, which have 
not demonstrated appropriate discriminant and predictive validity to warrant/justify their 
use; and (3) there is weak empirical evidence that emotional intelligence is related to 
anything of importance in organizations.  We thus end with an overview of the empirical 
evidence supporting the role of emotional intelligence in organizational and social 
behavior. 
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The Case for the Ability Based Model of Emotional Intelligence 
In Organizational Behavior 
Our challenge in this article is to refute the claims of Landy, Locke, and Conte 
(this issue), and make the more specific case for our perspective, which is that ability-
based models of emotional intelligence have value to add in the domain of organizational 
psychology.  Our first article (Ashkanasy & Daus, this issue) was primarily devoted to 
addressing the main points of criticism proffered by the three protagonists.  In this, our 
second article, we address remaining issues, and present an overview of the empirical 
evidence supporting the role of emotional intelligence in organizational and social 
behavior. 
One of Landy’s (this issue) primary contentions was that the historical 
introduction of the concept of social intelligence by Thorndike was never intended to be 
taken as a serious consideration of a distinct intelligence.  Landy contends further that 
Thorndike never saw nor promoted the value of social intelligence.  We agree that a 
historical understanding is crucial to be a critical evaluator of the claims.  To this end, an 
excerpt from Learning in War-Time an essay from the book, The Weight of Glory, by 
C.S. Lewis seems quite apropos: 
“Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad 
philosophy needs to be answered.  The cool intellect must work not only 
against cool intellect on the other side, but against the muddy heathen 
mysticisms which deny intellect altogether.  Most of all, perhaps, we need 
intimate knowledge of the past.  Not that the past has any magic about it, 
but because we cannot study the future, and yet need something to set 
against the present, to remind us that the basic assumptions have been 
quite different in different periods and that much which seems certain to 
the uneducated is merely temporary fashion.  A man who has lived in 
many places is not likely to be deceived by the local errors of his native 
village; the scholar has lived in many times and is therefore in some 
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degree immune from the great cataract of nonsense that pours from the 
press and the microphone of his own age.” 
 
We also agree with our opponents that there has been a great deal of rhetoric and 
unsubstantiated claims from proponents of some models of emotional intelligence.  After 
reading the evidence, we hope it is apparent to the reader how to separate the wheat from 
the chaff regarding emotional intelligence, and that we have convinced at least some 
readers of the value of the ability approach to emotional intelligence. 
While Landy has an admirable command of historical knowledge of the field of 
intelligence, and particularly the intricacies of Thorndike’s (both the ‘elder’ and the 
‘junior’) positions, we contend that this argument – about whether or not emotional 
intelligence is a distinct intelligence – is a red herring.  It diverts attention away from the 
more critical questions and issues.  Furthermore, this issue has already been debated in 
the academic literature and (we believe) settled definitively in the affirmative (see 
Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer & Salovey, 
1993; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001).  The ability model of emotional 
intelligence behaves psychometrically just as an intelligence should; and it demonstrates 
solid convergent and discriminant validity to support its claims to be an intelligence. 
Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) presented evidence and argued convincingly that 
emotional intelligence meets the standards set for something to be called an intelligence.  
These criteria are that a test of intelligence should have more-or-less correct answers 
(which the MSCEIT – the ability measure of emotional intelligence - does); that the 
patterns of correlations are similar to those of known intelligences and that it should 
correlate only modestly with other intelligences (see discussion below on psychometric 
properties); and that it should develop with age (Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 1999 present 
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this evidence).  Yet this still seems to be quite a bone of contention for both Landy and 
Locke; both explicitly or implicitly challenged this in their conference debates (DeNisi, 
2003) on the issue and in their articles in this issue.  All we can suggest regarding this 
question is that readers read the evidence for themselves and decide. 
This discussion above, which centered on debating an issue or point that has 
already been debated and definitively answered in the academic literature, should alert 
the reader to a disturbing pattern regarding opponents of emotional intelligence.  Often, 
we have found that opponents are selective in their reporting of the academic literature, 
failing to note evidence that doesn’t support their strong opinions that are contrary to the 
very idea and construct of emotional intelligence.  For example, in the initial SIOP debate 
April, 2003 (DeNisi, 2003), Landy and Locke failed to mention the bulk of the academic 
literature regarding the ability model.  Landy made use of one (outdated) reference by the 
originators of the construct and academic leaders in this area (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 
1999).  Locke cited none.  In their articles this issue, Locke makes reference to two of the 
articles by Mayer and colleagues, (Mayer, 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) neither very 
recent, and one (Mayer, 1999) more of a commentary; Landy refers to four of Mayer’s, 
two of which do not appear to be particularly relevant to the arguments at hand. This 
raises questions as to whether their arguments are sufficiently balanced.  We believe not 
and further, when the evidence that they fail to consider is taken into account, this will be 
easy to demonstrate. We argue that three elements are critical to our case, and are 
therefore the focus our attention in this article.  These are:  a) the distinction between the 
empirically, scientifically, and academically supported ability model of emotional 
intelligence (referred to as “Stream 1” models in Ashakansy & Daus, this issue) and the 
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more popularly known broad-based mixed models of emotional intelligence (“Stream 3” 
models); b) the history of the psychometric evidence supporting the ability-based model; 
and c) the body of empirical evidence in support of the importance of emotional 
intelligence in organizational behavior.  Finally in this vein, we want the reader to be 
clear about the academic literature regarding emotional intelligence.  What Landy and 
Locke have contended, verbally and in writing, is that most of the evidence regarding 
emotional intelligence is in the form of suspicious copyrighted databases, unpublished 
master’s theses, and doctoral dissertations, and popular journals such as Psychology 
Today.  We want to make it clear that the serious research into emotional intelligence is 
published in recognized quality academic journals. In this respect, a condensed and 
selected list of academic journals where Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and colleagues have 
published on emotional intelligence includes:  Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin; Personality and Individual Differences; Intelligence; Emotion; Journal of 
Personality Assessment; Imagination, Cognition, and Personality.  Academics will 
certainly recognize the caliber of these highly respected peer reviewed journals. 
In the following paragraphs, we deal specifically with three of the main points of 
criticism posted by our opponents.  There are that (1) emotional intelligence is dominated 
by opportunistic ‘academics-turned-consultants’ who have amassed much fame and 
fortune based on a concept that is shabby science at best; (2) the measurement of 
emotional intelligence is grounded in unstable (they change all the time), 
psychometrically flawed instruments, which have not demonstrated appropriate 
discriminant (particularly from the Big Five and general cognitive ability) and predictive 
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validity to warrant/justify their use; and (3) there is no (or weak) empirical evidence that 
emotional intelligence is related to anything of importance in organizations. 
Claim 1 
Emotional intelligence is dominated by opportunistic ‘academics-turned-consultants’ 
who have amassed much fame and fortune based on a concept that is shabby science at 
best. 
 
We have already addressed this issue in our first article (Ashkanasy & Daus) and 
in other articles (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002; Ashkanasy, Hartel, & Daus, 2002; Daus & 
Ashkanasy, 2003) as have Mayer and colleagues (Brackett, Lopes, Ivcevic, Mayer, & 
Salovey, 2004; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997; 2004; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2000a, 2000b; 2004a; 2004b) and others.  
To recapitulate briefly, there are three basic streams of emotional intelligence research 
and measures (see Ashkanasy & Daus, this issue):  Stream 1 is based on the Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso ability model of emotional intelligence and uses their measure/s (the 
MSCEIT, or earlier, MEIS); Stream 2 is also based on the Mayer, Salovey, Caruso ability 
model, but utilizes either a peer- or self-report  methodology; and Stream 3 comprises a 
group of broader, “mixed models” that include dimensions or components not included in 
the original definition of emotional intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  As we 
acknowledged in the first of our articles, we agree here somewhat with Landy and 
Locke’s perspectives, although we see value in the broad-based emotional intelligence 
approaches, or mixed-model approaches (as per Mayer and colleagues’ term for them) as 
tools for organizational development.  Furthermore, we feel it necessary to elucidate that 
the original direction of focus of many of the popular instruments and models came from 
other, broader concepts and theories (e.g., psychological well-being), and they seem 
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simply to have commandeered the term “emotional intelligence”.  We contend, however, 
that simply because there are others who, indeed, have developed quite a tidy business 
around a sexy, but misapplied name, does not nor should not, discount the credible and 
substantial body of academic evidence supporting the (much more narrowly defined) 
emotional intelligence construct.  In fact, we do not believe that we are even talking 
about the same construct as these other folks (e.g., Bar-On,1997; Goleman’s measure – 
Sala, 2002), and they, themselves, have made similar distinctions, as we explained in our 
earlier article.  Unfortunately, many of the reviews that have been unfavorable regarding 
emotional intelligence and its measurement have lumped together the ability model with 
these other types of models and evaluated the ‘overall’ evidence (e.g., Conte, this issue1; 
Davies, Stankov, Roberts, 1998; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; Roberts, Zeidner, 
& Matthews, 2001; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). 
We shall thus state our position yet one more time:  we prescribe to the Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso ability model (1997) of emotional intelligence which construes it as 
being comprised of four basic levels or branches:  1) perception of emotion in self and 
others; 2) assimilation of emotion to facilitate thought; 3) understanding of emotion; and 
4) regulating and managing emotion in self and others.  The operationalization of 
emotional intelligence as an ability model means that people must demonstrate skill in 
these four domains to be considered emotionally intelligent.  As examples of how this is 
done, participants must demonstrate that they can accurately read emotions in others’ 
facial expressions, and show that they could use good judgment and make good decisions 
regarding emotionally-laden scenarios.  We find it unfortunate that others have 
                                                 
1 At least for validity discussions, Conte lumped them together; he separated out the discussion for 
reliability by measure/perspective. 
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misapplied the name to models that are too broad-based to be legitimately labeled 
“emotional intelligence.”. 
Claim 2 
The measurement of emotional intelligence is grounded in unstable (they change all the 
time), psychometrically flawed instruments, which have not demonstrated appropriate 
discriminant (particularly from the Big Five and general cognitive ability) and predictive 
validity to warrant/justify their use. 
 
There are actually several criticisms incorporated into this second claim and we will 
briefly address each one. Landy (this issue, p. ??) stated, “It would be lovely if the 
concepts and the measurement instruments would settle down for a bit. …The construct 
and operational definition of the construct (i.e., the actual measurement instruments) are 
moving targets.”.  Specifically, regarding the ability-based approach, Landy criticizes that 
there is a revision of Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso’s measure (from the MEIS to the 
MSCEIT); therefore making it a ‘moving target.’  We feel that this is not a valid 
criticism, at least of the ability model of emotional intelligence.  The ability model of 
emotional intelligence reflects the construct development process that any good measure 
must undergo (See Jordan, Ashakansy, & Härtel, 2003).  One of the most well-known 
cognitive ability tests by an author/researcher that Landy (this issue, p. ??) referred to as a 
“luminary” in the field of intelligence measurement, the WAIS (the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale; Wechsler, 1950; 1997) has undergone three versions since its 
introduction in 1932. 
To make this point in respect of emotional intelligence, we argue that there are 
four critical stages of construct development (see also Jordan et al., 2003).  In the first 
stage, a construct is proposed in the academic literature (as emotional intelligence was by 
Salovey, & Mayer 1990).  This is followed in the second stage by initial measurement 
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attempts, which progress drawing from extant, related literature (e.g., Ekman’s, 1975, and 
Buck’s, 1976, work on perceiving emotion in faces; Palfai & Salovey’s, 1993, and Isen 
and colleagues’ work on emotions and problem-solving; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 
1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978) and 
proposing additional, new ideas.  With respect to emotional intelligence, these were 
represented in a series of publications on various emotional intelligence tasks (e. g., 
Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Mayer & Geher, 1996) which later were 
psychometrically revised and incorporated into the first overall emotional intelligence 
measure, the MEIS, or Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 1999). 
In Stage 3, the psychometric properties of reliability and validity are further 
tested with results, both good and bad, published in academic journals for other 
psychometricians and academics to evaluate; the MEIS was, indeed, subject to such 
justifiable scrutiny (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000a, 2000b; Caruso, Mayer & Salovey, 
2002), and came away from the boxing ring having landed some solid ‘punches’ for the 
ability-model approach (for the most part, reasonably good internal consistency, ranging 
from .62 - .95, for the overall MEIS; and solid convergent and discriminant - from the 
Big Five and cognitive ability - , validity), yet clearly needing some revision (shortening; 
clearing up scoring issues; etc.). 
Finally, Stage 4 involves revision and scrutiny of the measure (currently, there 
is a revised measure by Mayer and colleagues, the MSCEIT – Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 
Emotional Intelligence Test, 2002, in its second version).  The MSCEIT was released to 
researchers in 2000, published generally in 2002, normed on 5000 people, and has been 
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stable through these six years (2000-2005).  Cronbach and Meehl (1955), the 
granddaddies of construct development, wrote about the construct development process 
and described constructs (in the early stages) as “inductive summaries” and had this to 
say in one of their final summary points:  “The investigation of a test’s construct validity 
is not essentially different from the general scientific procedures for developing and 
confirming theories” (pg. 299).  Thus, it takes time and many studies.  In short, it is a 
developmental process.  In our opinion, Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey are to be applauded 
in that it has only been a decade and a half since the construct/term was first introduced, 
and they have developed a solid and comprehensive measure, in addition to amassing 
considerable evidence/data regarding the psychometric and predictive properties.  It is 
this issue on which we now focus our discussion. 
Reliability 
Several commentaries on emotional intelligence have questioned the reliability 
(primarily internal consistency) of the MEIS/MSCEIT (Davies, Stankov, Roberts, 1998; 
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001).  Indeed, 
some subtasks of the MEIS had low internal consistency estimates; yet these subtasks 
were never intended or developed to be used individually (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 
2004a; 2004b).  It’s akin to all the researchers who tested expectancy theory as a between 
subjects model (it was intended as a within subjects model), found low validity, and then 
claimed it was an invalid model.  Further, the current evidence for the MSCEIT shows 
strong internal consistency reliability; and do note that Conte (this issue) weighs in 
positively about the reliability of the MSCEIT.  The MSCEIT’s overall internal 
consistency reliability ranged from r = .90 to .96 (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2004a), 
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with branch score reliabilities (representing the four branches listed earlier) ranging from 
.76 (facilitating branch) - .98 (understanding and perceiving branches; Mayer, et al., 
2002; Mayer, et al., 2004a; Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough, 2004). 
Validity 
Regarding the factorial validity, confirmatory factor analyses confirm that there is 
evidence of a unitary, overall emotional intelligence factor (Palmer, et al., 2004; Mayer et 
al. 2003).  Additionally, 4-factor solutions representing each of the four branches present 
an excellent fit to the data (Day & Carroll, 2004; Mayer et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 2004a; 
Palmer et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2001) although one set of research findings (Palmer et 
al., 2004) with an Australian sample suggest that there is no distinguishable difference 
between the three and four-factor models and concomitantly, between Branches 2 and 4. 
Further confusion abounds, however, regarding the MSCEIT’s discriminant 
validity.  Early on in the flurry of criticism of emotional intelligence, Davies, Stankov, 
and Roberts (1998) retorted that:  “…little remains of emotional intelligence that is 
unique and psychometrically sound”  (p. 1013).  This was seen by some as ‘the death 
blow’ to the emotional intelligence construct, and was used by many to counter any 
suggestion of legitimate use of the construct.  The strongest criticism by Landy, Locke 
and others (Conte, this issue; Davies, Stankov, Roberts, 1998; Matthews, Zeidner, & 
Roberts, 2002; Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004) is 
that emotional intelligence is either not distinct from other types of intelligence, or adds 
no predictive validity beyond cognitive ability.  Related, criticisms about that emotional 
intelligence is really little more than a constellation of the Big Five factors, and is thus 
not distinct from personality.  As we mentioned earlier, however, this issue is quite 
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muddled as most reports examining the so-called ‘evidence’ have lumped together the 
MSCEIT with other measures.  Examining the evidence for the MSCEIT separately 
provides initial, solid evidence that emotional intelligence (as operationalized by Mayer, 
Salovey, and Caruso) is distinct from both cognitive ability and personality.   
Examining first the relationship between emotional intelligence and cognitive 
ability, we find that the highest level of relationship between any emotional intelligence 
branch and cognitive ability is with the understanding emotions branch (which focuses on 
a person’s ability to label emotions and understand how emotions are related to one 
another and progress), the correlations of which range between .25 and .40, thus sharing 
at most 16% of the variance; the range of correlations for overall emotional intelligence 
and cognitive ability is .14 - .36 (see Mayer, et al., 2004a for a comprehensive review).  
These numbers, to us, indicate a quite acceptable level of discrimination from cognitive 
ability. 
The argument that emotional intelligence is nothing more than a constellation of 
personality traits (specifically, the Big Five), is perhaps an even stronger and more 
consistent criticism than the lack of discriminant validity from cognitive ability.  This 
particular claim has remained a solid one from antagonists of the emotional intelligence 
position, in our opinion, largely because of the aforementioned reviews (Conte, this issue; 
Davies, Stankov, Roberts, 1998; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; Roberts, Zeidner, 
& Matthews, 2001; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004), which lumped other measures in 
with the MSCEIT and indeed found much overlap between personality and emotional 
intelligence.  The evidence for the discriminant validity of emotional intelligence (ability-
based measure) and personality is even more compelling than that of cognitive ability:  
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average correlations across five studies (with sample sizes > 150) for each of the five 
factors and total emotional intelligence ranged from a low of .06  (extroversion) to .21 
(agreeableness).  The highest single correlation that we could find between any branch 
and a Big Five factor was between management of emotion and agreeableness at .39 (see 
Mayer et al., 2004a, for a comprehensive review of this data).  Of note and for clarity, 
two widely-used measures of emotional intelligence (both self-report) suffer from 
substantial overlap with the Big Five:  Bar-On’s Eqi (Bar-On, 1997) had a multiple R of 
.75, and Schutte’s (Schutte, et al., 1998) scale’s multiple R was .52.  Once again, we feel 
the data and evidence strongly support our claim that the ability-model of emotional 
intelligence shows discriminant validity from the Big Five model of personality. 
Claim 3 
There is no (or weak) empirical evidence that emotional intelligence is related to 
anything of importance in organizations. 
 
We regard this as potentially the most damaging claim of our opponents, and so 
devote much of the rest of this article to the evidence that will refute this proposition.  We 
have grouped the research into three primary areas that appear both to be the most logical 
areas of application for emotional intelligence in organizations, and also appear to have 
garnered the most research attention to date:  (1) Leadership, (2) job performance, and 
(3) emotional labor. 
Leadership 
We agree with Landy (this issue) that researchers in emotional intelligence need 
to pick their criterion variables with more discretion; i.e., choose those that actually make 
sense in relation to emotional intelligence.  He mentioned leadership emergence as one 
such logical area, and George (2000) has also written compellingly about the logical tie 
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between emotional intelligence and leadership.  We agree wholeheartedly.  Related, 
Ashkanasy and Tse (1998) argue convincingly that emotion-related variables can be 
important at every stage of the process linking transformational leadership and work-
group outcomes, and Prati, Douglas, Ferris, Ammeter, and Buckley (2003) developed a 
conceptual model for the merging of emotional intelligence, leadership, team processes, 
and outcomes, and argued that emotional intelligence skills were critical for effective 
team leadership and outcomes.  We also argue that transformational leadership and 
specific aspects of emotional intelligence (emotion management) seem to have an 
intuitive and compelling relationship (see George, 2000). 
Research has substantiated this intuition.  For example, Daus and Harris (2003) 
studied leader emergence, transformational leadership, and emotional intelligence 
(measured with the MEIS) over a semester using a student sample of a small groups class 
with a large final group project required.  We found that, indeed, emotional intelligence 
did predict leader emergence and was related to transformational leadership.  
Specifically, leadership emergence rated by group members was significantly related to 
the managing others’ emotions branch of emotional intelligence.  Furthermore, overall 
transformational leadership (as well as all five dimensions of transformational leadership) 
was significantly associated with the understanding emotions branch of emotional 
intelligence (Daus & Harris, 2003).  Others (Coetzee & Schaap, 2004) have reported 
similar findings from a survey study of 100 South African managers regarding 
transformational leadership, transactional leadership and emotional intelligence.  They 
found that transformational leadership was related to overall emotional intelligence, as 
well as two branches (identifying and managing emotion).  They also found that 
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transactional leadership was related to the managing emotion branch, and non-
transactional, or ‘laissez-faire’ leadership was inversely related the using emotion branch. 
Rubin, Munz, and Bommer (in press) examined only the emotion recognition 
aspect of emotional intelligence and found interesting relationships, based on a sample of 
145 managers of a large biotechnology/agricultural company.  In this study, the research 
team examined how leader emotion recognition ability and personality characteristics 
influenced performance of transformational leadership behavior. Emotion recognition, 
positive affectivity, and agreeableness positively predicted transformational leadership 
ability.  In addition, extraversion moderated the relationship between emotion recognition 
and transformational leadership ability, such that increased levels of leader extraversion 
strengthened the relationship between leader emotional recognition and transformational 
leader behavior.  Lopes, et al. (2004) found that emotional intelligence was related to 
both peer-rated leadership potential (marginally) and supervisor-rated leadership potential 
(strongly) in a sample of 44 analysts and clerical employees; these relationships remained 
even after controlling for the Big Five, education, and cognitive ability (verbal ability), 
among other variables (e.g., age, gender, trait affect, and coping approach). 
Also, there is evidence that the level of emotional intelligence that is critical for 
leadership success is a function of how central emotional intelligence may be to the 
career or occupation.  Collins (2001) studied 59 senior executives from a large 
international production and service organization and found that levels of emotional 
intelligence in successful leaders declined up the corporate hierarchy for career tracks 
where emotional intelligence skills were not critical or necessary.  Part of 
transformational leadership is developing, communicating, and garnering commitment to 
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a vision (Avolio & Bass, 1999; Kouzes & Posner, 1990), and indeed, those with higher 
emotional intelligence wrote higher quality vision statements than low emotional 
intelligence others (significant effects remained even after controlling for the Big Five; 
see Côté, Lopes, & Salovey, 2004).  Regarding vision, research has also demonstrated 
that subordinates whose supervisors have higher emotional intelligence are also more 
committed to the organization (Giles, 2001), in general, as well as to the organization’s 
vision.  In one organization, supervisors who had higher emotion management skills had 
subordinates who had higher organizational commitment and commitment to the vision, 
and in another organization, supervisors with higher emotional understanding had 
subordinates with higher commitment.  Finally, the understanding emotions branch of 
emotional intelligence appears to predict accuracy in self-ratings of leaders – those with 
lower levels of this ability overrated their own leadership (as assessed by direct reports), 
while those with higher levels underrated their own leadership (Collins, 2001). 
Clearly, and possibly to the surprise of the detractors of emotional intelligence, 
the emerging empirical evidence supports the link between leadership ability (particularly 
transformational leadership) and the abilities-based model of emotional intelligence.  
This is plainly an exciting area of research in organizational behavior, and where the 
abilities model of emotional intelligence appears to continue to have great potential. 
Job Performance 
In discussing performance, we deal separately with individual performance and 
group performance. 
Individual performance. Once again, heeding Landy’s warning about criterion 
choices, we find that it is in jobs that would seem to require high levels of emotional 
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intelligence where the research seems to bear out the predictions of a positive relationship 
between emotional intelligence and job performance.  Daus (2002) and colleagues (Cage, 
Daus, & Saul, 2004; Daus, Rubin & Cage, 2004; Daus, Rubin, Smith & Cage, 2004) have 
undertaken a series of initiatives to show that for jobs that would appear logically to 
require a high level of emotional intelligence, there is in reality a positive relationship 
between emotional intelligence and job performance.  Police officers are employed in a 
career that has one of the highest emotional labor demands (Glomb, Kammeyer-Mueller, 
& Rotundo, 2004), which Hochchild (1983) has defined as managing emotions as a 
condition of remuneration.  Given that there is a high demand for officers to manage their 
own and others’ emotions, it would seem that high levels of emotional intelligence would 
predict aspects of officer performance.  In an ongoing series of research projects 
regarding police officers, both qualitative data (intensive semi-structured interviews with 
patrol officers and their supervisors, investigators, dispatchers, and police chiefs; Daus, 
Rubin, & Cage, 2004) and quantitative data (Daus, Rubin, Smith, & Cage, 2004) support 
that aspects of emotional intelligence are critical for effective job performance and the 
prevention of negative stress outcomes from the job.  Furthermore, aspects of emotional 
intelligence predicted job satisfaction and inversely predicted turnover intentions (Daus, 
et al., 2004). 
Another type of job with strong emotional intelligence implications is that of 
customer service and/or retail sales.  The sheer amount of interaction with customers and 
the fact that job performance is largely determined by customer interaction speak to the 
necessity of having emotional skills and abilities – both in self and in dealing with others.  
Daus (2002), in a laboratory simulation of a customer service event, demonstrated the 
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link between emotional intelligence of the ‘customer service rep’ (the participants in the 
experiment) and job performance in relation to the handling of an angry customer (played 
by confederates in the experiment).  The dimension of reading emotions (from the MEIS) 
was inversely related to rated job performance, and managing emotions in self was 
positively related to job performance as rated by independent observers/raters.  Reading 
emotions in faces, or emotional perception, is the lowest level of emotional intelligence.  
If one can read the emotions well, but not manage them, job performance may be worse 
because he/she knows that the customer is in a poor mood, but yet they cannot do 
anything about it.  Because mood management (managing emotions in self) is a higher 
level function and would be critical in such a scenario, it showed a positive relationship 
to job performance.  As well, in this study, dimensions of emotional intelligence (reading 
emotions in faces; managing emotion in self) were related both to work attitudes (job 
satisfaction) and emotional labor (discussed below).  Recently, Cage, Daus, and Saul 
(2004) have extended these results with a field sample of sales/customer service reps in a 
department store using the updated MSCEIT, both subjective (‘secret shopper’ ratings) 
criterion data, and more ‘objective’ criterion data (sales).  Results essentially expand and 
mirror Daus (2002):  the utilizing emotions branch of emotional intelligence was 
significantly associated with rated customer service performance; the managing emotions 
branch was significantly associated with actual sales performance, and understanding 
emotions was significantly associated with job satisfaction (Cage, Daus, & Saul, 2004). 
Finally, the study by Lopes and colleagues (2004) with the 44 analysts and 
clerical employees, demonstrated the relationship between emotional intelligence and 
work outcomes (dependent upon job performance).  Those scoring higher on the 
The Case for Emotional Intelligence, Paper 2 
 
20
MSCEIT received greater merit increases, held higher company rank, and received better 
peer and supervisor ratings of interpersonal facilitation, stress tolerance and leadership 
potential.  For the most part, these relationships held and predicted above and beyond the 
influence of the Big Five and cognitive ability (among other variables).  It appears that 
the higher level abilities of understanding and managing emotion were most strongly 
related to the more ‘objective’ criteria (salary and company rank), and the lower level 
abilities of perceiving and using emotion were most strongly predictive of the more 
subjective, peer and supervisor-rated variables.  Clearly, evidence from all these recent 
studies indicates that emotional intelligence skills are important in predicting job 
performance for at least some types of jobs. 
Group performance.  Emotional intelligence is also important in work groups or 
teams.  Rice (1999) studied 26 teams of claims adjusters working in the financial services 
center of a large insurance company.  She found that teams with higher average 
emotional intelligence received higher performance ratings for managers, particularly for 
customer service.  Lopes, Cote, Salovey, and Beers (2003) examined the emotional 
intelligence of 91 students working on a 10-week project in small teams.  Individuals 
who were better able to manage emotions were more satisfied with other group members 
and with the communication, and also reported receiving more social support. 
Emotional Labor 
As we mentioned earlier, emotional labor is defined as managing emotion for 
remuneration (Hochschild, 1983) and, as such, it has obvious apparent relationships with 
emotional intelligence (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002).  Research on emotional labor has 
developed quickly recently with empirical demonstrations of the often negative effects of 
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emotional labor on employees (e.g., regarding high stress, burnout, lower job satisfaction, 
etc.; Grandey, 2000; Kruml & Geddes, 2000).  Thus, an individual skill such as 
emotional intelligence, which might moderate or ameliorate the negative consequences of 
emotional labor, would be critical to explore.  Emotional labor is highest in jobs with a 
high amount of contact with clients and customers (such as in customer service 
occupations and the helping professions).  Indeed, both laboratory and field research has 
begun to demonstrate the important relationships between emotional intelligence and 
emotional labor.  In both studies mentioned above with simulated customer service 
representatives (Daus, 2002) and actual customer service reps/sales personnel (Cage, 
Daus, & Saul, 2004), relationships between emotional intelligence and emotional labor 
were confirmed.  Daus (2002) found that people who could better read emotions in faces 
felt less of an emotional load from the job, and people who could better manage emotions 
in themselves felt more of an emotional load, which is somewhat counter to the 
hypothesis that those higher in emotional intelligence should feel less emotional labor.  
Perhaps these findings again are more complex due to the hierarchical nature of mood 
management – if I can manage my mood, I feel it more incumbent upon me to do so.  
Cage et al. (2004) found further that the understanding emotions dimension of emotional 
intelligence was positively associated with the faking positive aspect of emotional labor.  
Further, expressing negative emotions was inversely associated with actual sales 
performance.  The study with the police officers (Daus, Rubin, Smith, & Cage, 2004) 
further demonstrated a definitive link between aspects of emotional labor and emotional 
intelligence.  Overall, emotional intelligence was significantly associated with both deep 
acting (actually feeling the emotion) of emotional labor, as well as suppressing negative 
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emotions.  Further, all four branches of emotional intelligence were significantly 
associated with deep acting; one (understanding emotions) was associated with surface 
acting; three (all but understanding emotions) were significantly associated with 
suppressing negative emotions; and one (using emotions) was associated with faking 
positive emotions.  
In another study, Brotheridge (2003) found that additional incremental variance in 
surface acting (expressing the appropriate emotions without actually feeling them) was 
explained (beyond emotional labor antecedents, and the personality variable of emotional 
expressivity) by the managing emotions in self and others branch of the MSCEIT.  Also, 
like with leadership, emotional intelligence seems to predict better in those jobs requiring 
more of it (and requiring more emotional labor):  Janovics and Christiansen (2002) found 
that in those jobs with the most direct contact with customers, higher emotional 
intelligence scores predicted better supervisor ratings, even after controlling for the 
effects of cognitive intelligence.  Finally and related in this vein, Rice (1999) found that 
customer satisfaction was higher with claims adjustments made by teams whose average 
emotional intelligence was higher. 
In summary, it appears that emotional intelligence clearly has much to offer the 
domain of emotional labor and jobs that require high amounts of it such as customer and 
social service types of occupations, and those that require a high amount of interaction 
with the public.  We expect both the general relationship between emotional intelligence 
and emotional labor to be further refined (e.g., such that those who have higher emotional 
intelligence are more skilled at emotional labor, and suffer fewer negative consequences 
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from it), as well as more specific linkages between different dimensions of each to be 
explicated.   
Conclusion 
In summary, the ability approach to emotional intelligence has clearly 
demonstrated solid psychometric properties, and has both predictive and incremental 
validity in predicting organizational outcomes.  It is a useful construct that has both a 
developmental past and future.  We have only reviewed the direct evidence relevant to 
organizational behavior.  Of note, in other arenas of psychology, the ability approach to 
emotional intelligence has garnered a substantial body of evidence and support.  For 
example, two recent studies (Lopes, Brackett, Nexlek, Schutz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; 
Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2004) have demonstrated that the ability to manage 
emotions contributes positively to the quality of social interactions, above and beyond the 
contributions of the Big Five personality traits (in both studies), and intelligence (in 
Lopes, Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2004).  We expect to see such results continue to 
proliferate and begin to cross fertilize the organizational behavior domain, and we are 
excited for this to happen. 
In closing, we would like to acknowledge a few caveats.  We have organized our 
review based on the research that we feel constitutes a firm core or body of evidence.  
There are several individual studies published demonstrating the ability approach to 
emotional intelligence in other areas of organizational functioning (such as in an 
interview setting, both emotional intelligence of interviewer and interviewee).  We felt it 
best not to present a series of disjointed studies, but rather a set of coherent studies 
organized to make a cogent argument.  Also, we wish to reinforce a point made earlier, 
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and consistent with the points raised by Jordan et al. (2003), that the ability model 
emotional intelligence is in its infancy as a construct.  We anticipate seeing a continued 
deluge of published work in refereed journals that support the ability model of emotional 
intelligence in all sorts of arenas, both organizational and non-organizational.  Thus, we 
anticipate with excitement the changing scenery of the emotional intelligence landscape 
in the near and distant future. 
In conclusion, we hope that these two articles will serve to answer the criticism of 
the detractors of emotional intelligence research, as represented by our opponents in this 
point-counterpoint issue.  In this paper, we have assiduously stuck to the Stream 1 
‘abilities’ model of emotional intelligence, measures using the MEIS or MSCEIT 
(Ashkanasy & Daus, this issue).  We feel that it is especially important for researchers to 
recognize that this is the only strictly valid model of emotional intelligence, although we 
recognize that Stream 2 models (self-report measures based on the Mayer and Salovey, 
1997) definition can be useful in certain circumstances (e.g., Jordan & Troth, 2004; 
Offermann, Bailey, Vasilopoulos, Seal, & Sass, 2004).  Our opponents make the classical 
error of confusing the various models, especially the Stream 3 models, which introduce 
dimensions that are additional to the original definition of the emotional intelligence 
construct.  Readers of this issue – and future researchers of emotional intelligence – need 
to take care that they do not themselves fall into the same trap. 
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